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Introduction 
As a long-term admirer of David Hume, I was struck with 
some astonishment, on a second reading of Of Miracles, that 
someone so influential and profound could make such an obvious 
and seemingly deliberate logical fallacy. Moreover, the fallacy 
Hume commits—the ad hominem fallacy—is not a minor error 
insignificant to the whole of his argument, but is a major component 
to Hume's rejection of miracles and, more generally, to his dismissal 
of testimony as sound epistemology. My astonishment at Hume's 
remarks, coupled with my bias of his philosophy, led me (rightly 
or wrongly) to want to justify—and perhaps apologize or even 
excuse—his personal argument against the credibility of those 
professing to have been witness to a miracle. Help in this regard 
came from an unlikely source: Formal testimony in Canadian law. 
The thesis I will argue for is that arguments of the form 
argumentum ad hominem (literally, 'argument against a man'), 
when they are of the non-fallacious type, are forms of critical 
reasoning every thinking person is obliged to commit. In other 
words, I'll argue for the normative justification of non-fallacious 
ad hominem arguments. 
Since the distinction between fallacious and non-fallacious 
forms of ad hominem arguments is well known, I will restrict myself 
to the following brief characterization. It is not the case that every 
instance of an ad hominem argument is fallacious. Consider, 
[I]n some cases a successful argument against the person can 
bring into question an arguer's impartiality, sincerity, or 
trustworthiness. This may be a weak form of argument, but it 
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may be enough to alter the burden of proof on a controversial 
issue. And therefore it can be a reasonable criticism. On 
controversial issues, hard evidence that can be directly brought 
to bear on a disputed proposition may be lacking. In such a 
case, reasonable dialogue may be the only available way of 
deciding to accept a conclusion, short of deciding by random 
choice or by following one's dogmatic inclinations. Here, 
understanding the arguer's positions both pro and con may help 
to make a commitment, if a decision must be made. If an arguer's 
position is open to fair criticism of internal inconsistency, that 
could be a good reason for anyone to withhold acceptance of the 
arguer's conclusion based on that position (Walton, 1989, p. 156). 
On this view, the legitimacy of ad hominem arguments depends 
on the relevant circumstances surrounding the acceptance or 
rejection of testimony /. These circumstances include such 
determining factors as the impartiality of the speaker, their sincerity, 
or trustworthiness. Of course, other characteristics such as 
reliability and general honesty could be added, expanding the scope 
of what should be taken into consideration. The criterion of relevant 
circumstance allows an interlocutor to consider and use non-
fallaciously in judgment antecedent conditions surrounding the 
arguer's position or, depending on the case, their testimony. With 
this justificatory aid, one is in a better position to arrive at an 
informed and considered judgement of the argument at hand, than 
if we were to consider the argument either uncritically as true or, 
more typically, by questioning the truth of its premises. It is 
precisely the difference between 'relevant ' and ' irrelevant ' 
considerations that warrant either the fallacious or non-fallacious 
application of this form of argument. It is indefensible to argue, 
due to factors that bear no relevance to the argument at hand (say, 
that Jones is an Aristotelian and certainly they cannot be trusted), 
that the argument offered is therefore false. On the other hand, it 
is defendable to argue, due to factors such as, for example, the 
impartiality, sincerity, or trustworthiness of the arguer, that the 
position being advocated may not be true. We could say, then, that 
the justification for (non-fallacious) ad hominem arguments is any 
reasonable person's commitment to what might be called Intellectual 
Responsibility—what I call the 'responsibility thesis' (RT). 
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According to RT it is any reasonable person's obligation 
to consider any facts that may be relevant given testimony t, 
before accepting/rejecting testimony t 
This essay will determine how Intellectual Responsibility 
justifies Hume's position lest, of course, my admiration of Hume 
be lost. 
In the secondary literature, Hume's argument against miracles 
is usually presented in two parts. First, the entire human experience 
of the uniformity of nature amounts to a 'proof of sorts against 
the veracity of miracles (Beckwith, 1989, p.24). "A miracle", Hume 
writes, "is a violation of the law of nature; and as a firm and 
unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against 
a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any 
argument from experience can possibly be imagined" (EHU, p.76). 
Such an argument, thinks Hume, 'diminishes extremely' the 
assurance we often assume from natural testimony. Consider: Our 
experience of the uniformity of nature is much more consistent 
than a 'proof for the opposite thesis—v/z., a particular speech-act 
to the effect that a violation of the law of nature has occurred. For 
Hume, when we thus have 'proof against proof we weigh the 
probability (a 'probability judgment') that nature's laws have been 
violated against the probability that they have not been violated 
and conclude by rejecting the greater 'miracle' (or the one with 
the lower probability). For Hume, when considering whether a 
miracle has occurred, we end up 'checking' testimony against our 
overwhelming experience of the uniformity of nature, and even 
though miraculous reports excite the passions and imagination, 
thereby inciting us to believe, we ought not to, but should instead 
reject such reports using our experience as a conclusive 
arbitrator. Hence, when deliberating on putative miracles Hume 
writes, 
I weigh one miracle against the other; and according to the 
superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and 
always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his 
testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he 
relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my 
belief or opinion (EHU, p.77). 
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Notice, Hume does not juxtapose 'demonstration against 
demonstration' whereby he would be referring to conclusions that 
follow self-evidently from given premises. Instead, 'proof in this 
context refers to arguments yielding only practical certainty (Burns, 
1980, p. 146). In this way, the extraordinary nature of a miracle, of 
a violation of the law of nature, actually counts against a miracle 
from occurring. In the second part of Hume's argument he 
demonstrates that there has never been evidence for a miracle that 
constitutes a full proof (Beckwith, 1989, p.22). This is where we 
take leave from the secondary literature and focus instead, and in 
greater detail, on an early chief point Hume raises against miracles. 
Hume's ad hominem Argument 
In one way there is nothing really new in Of Miracles that we 
have not already seen in Hume before. In the Enquiry, as throughout 
the entire Humean corpus, Hume maintains a critical philosophy— 
at least for theoretical purposes (or, that is, until a good game of 
backgammon (T, p. 175)). What is new in this text is Hume's 
uncharacteristic aversion to inducing scepticism through his 
standard arguments. Quite the contrary. Hume is not interested in 
miracles as autonomous metaphysical entities and therefore does 
not (and indeed cannot) dispel with miracles using the same 
criterion that he has used to reject the objects of metaphysics proper. 
Hume does not ask, for example, 'From what sensory impression 
is the idea of a miracle derived?' Doubtless Hume realized that 
one could actually experience a complex impression that constitutes 
a violation of the laws of nature. In terms of the metaphysical 
implications of Hume's epistemology, it is not impossible that we 
should have a complex impression, which begets a complex idea, 
of 'miracle'. We could simply experience one. What is decidedly 
impossible, however, is that we should ever, as judic ious 
inquisitors, satisfy the conditions Hume thinks need to be satisfied 
in order to assent to the testimony of others. Strictly speaking, 
knowledge for Hume is a product of experience and only your 
experience. Empirical knowledge cannot be obtained indirectly 
through testimony. It follows, upon hearing the testimony of others, 
that the question is not one of obtaining knowledge as such, but is 
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a question of belief and assenting that the propositions that 
constitute the belief are true. The question is simply 'Should I 
believe testimony t or not?' The issue of whether to assent to the 
testimony of others is not only critical to Hume's position on 
miracles, but actually constitutes a remarkably encompassing thesis 
on Hume's part: "There is no species of reasoning more common, 
more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is 
derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye witnesses 
and spectators" (EHU, p. 74). Much turns, to be sure, on what 
compelling reasons there may be for accepting (or rejecting) the 
testimony of others. 
What I take to be at the same time the most important—and 
alarming—criticism of Hume's attack on miracles is their 
foundation in the testimony of a witness who lacks the credibility 
to be believed. Hume makes his intentions clear: He will settle for 
nothing less than silencing "the most arrogant bigotry and 
superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations" (EHU 
p.73). For Hume, the conditions of psychologically accepting the 
testimony of others cannot be satisfied. It is not the case that Hume 
is maintaining, as we see Descartes maintain, an infallabilist 
conception of knowledge, but one, at least in regards to testimony, 
that is fatalistic to testimony as epistemology. The foundation for 
believing in the testimony of a witness, or in other words of 
assenting to the propositions that form the testimony as true, 
depends solely on the credibility of the witness. In response to the 
question 'How do you know the witness is credible?' and hence 
'How do you know that the propositions that form the content of 
testimony are true?' Hume's answer is that you don't. And if you 
have no good reason for thinking the witness credible, although it 
does not mean the witness is not credible, it is better to err on the 
side of caution by doubting (or rejecting) their testimony rather 
than by accepting it. To put the point in different terms, the 
credibility of a witness can always be doubted and therefore we 
can always doubt or reject their testimony. According to the Western 
tradition that is one criterion of an ad hominem argument (Kelly, 
1988, p. 138). Of course, this still leaves open the possibility that 
there are credible witnesses and that their testimony could be 
assented to. A possibility I will address below. But what exactly 
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are the conditions that Hume thinks need to be satisfied, but that 
cannot be satisfied, before assenting to tl 
Call p the criteria Hume determines for accepting t. Hume 
formulates p as follows: 
Upon hearing the testimony of others, " . . . I immediately 
consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this 
person should either deceive or be deceived . . ." (EHU p.77, 
italics mine). 
I have already mentioned that this is a point of departure in 
the secondary literature, which, as far as I know, almost exclusively 
deals with miracles as metaphysical events—events that Hume 
does not characteristically approach. Whether a miracle has actually 
occurred, whether a violation of the laws of nature 'should really 
have happened,' does not matter one way or another in regards to 
the testimony of the witness. What is important is whether Hume 
regards the character of the speaker as credible; not whatever in 
particular the speaker has to say. Hume is saying, in effect, ' I just 
don't trust this person' or 'I think this person could possibly be 
deceived by others or would willfully try to deceive me—I can't 
accept what they say.' Remarkably, Hume counsels, if, by your 
best and honest estimation, you think it is only possible that this 
person would deceive you, or that this person has the mere capacity 
to be deceived, then forget it, their testimony is worthless. It cannot 
satisfy Hume's stringent criteria. Now, by arguing against the 
credibility of someone professing a miracle is Hume not committing 
a fallacy of 'rational' thinking? Specifically, by arguing against 
the credibility of someone professing a miracle, is Hume not grossly 
committing a form of the ad hominem fallacy? Not only is the use 
of the fallacy obvious and evident but when it is of the non-
fallacious kind—as Hume's is—it is entirely justified. 
Ad hominem Fallacies 
While there are different forms of fallacious ad hominem 
arguments, all of them involve an attempt to avoid or dismiss 
dealing with a statement (q) based on the merits of q itself. In each 
case, moreover, the method is one of rejecting q based on some 
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(perceived or actual) negative trait of the speaker (Kelly, 1988, 
p. 137). Ad hominem arguments may take the shape of mere personal 
insults—such and such is an idiot, lazy, a slob, a plumber, or 
whatever—so I have no reason to accept what they say. This type 
of ad hominem attack asks the question 'What can this person 
know?' Another form of ad hominem argument involves rejecting 
what someone says based on inconsistencies between testimony 
and practice. Hence, as the story goes, when Aristotle counseled 
Alexander to have nothing to do with Phyllis, as not to distract 
him from his studies, The Philosopher later replied after having 
been caught in a compromising position with her, 'do as I say, not 
as I do ' . 1 This version of the argument asks 'Why should I believe 
or do something if you don't believe or do it?' Lastly, ad hominem 
arguments may take the form of impinging upon someone's 
objectivity by claiming that they have a vested interest in 
defending the veracity of their own position (Kelly, 1988, 
p. 139). Claming that Tarot card readers are unwil l ing to 
reasonably entertain criticism because they have a vested 
interest in perpetuating the ' truth' of astrology is an example 
of this kind of argument. In all cases, ad hominem arguments 
have the following form 
(x says q) + (x has some negative trait) 
So q is false2 
Hume seems to be incorporating two versions of the fallacy. 
First, by questioning whether someone is susceptible to deception, 
Hume is rather politely forwarding a personal insult. Although 
Hume does not give a detailed explanation why, I take him to be 
insinuating criticism along the following lines: On the basis of 
their background, lack of education, lack of credentials, particular 
social status, and so on, x cannot possibly be of such discerning 
character that he or she is beyond being fooled. Second, by 
questioning whether .v would willfully deceive you, Hume is 
suggesting that they have some vested interest in the affair (maybe 
x wants attention, or is religiously inclined, or wants to impress 
you, or is motivated by what he or she may get in return). Hume's 
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criteria for accepting the testimony of others—the criteria I labeled 
p—can be formulated in terms of simple modes tollens 
PI/ If x is to accept the testimony of y, then y must be of 
scrupulous disposition (viz., y could neither be deceived nor 
would willfully deceive). 
P2/ It is impossible forj> to be of scrupulous disposition. 
CI So x is right to reject the testimony of y. 
There is good reason for thinking it impossible to find 
individuals of'scrupulous disposition'. There are none. In principle, 
it is impossible that someone could be of such sound mind and 
disposition that he or she is beyond even the possibility of being 
deceived and, subsequently, of passing that deception on to you. It is 
also quite impossible to be absolutely certain that someone who reports 
a miracle would not willfully try to deceive you. After all, Hume thinks, 
"it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all ages. You must 
surely have seen enough instances of that frailty" (EHU, p.80). 
In the last section, I raised the possibility that, if a person 
reporting a miracle happened to be of reputable character, then 
principally, even Hume could assent to their testimony. At this 
point we have reason to doubt that this is the case. There is no 
reason to suppose, of course, that someone who is in good standing 
with us is immune from the error possibilities mentioned. In other 
words, it is simply false that someone of good character could 
possibly satisfy Hume's impossible criteria. Besides, supposing 
someone of strong disposition reports on bearing witness to a 
miracle, Hume can still use his initial argument from the uniformity 
of experience as a conclusive refutation. Although Hume does not 
offer a disputatious refutation of testimony, he clearly thinks that 
the criteria that need to be satisfied cannot be satisfied. (The 
stronger claim would be—and this contention would require a paper 
of its own - that this component of Of Miracles is a continuation 
of a general problem of Renaissance theology and philosophy, the 
Problem of the Criterion). 
The deeper philosophical issue being raised here by Hume is 
that human beings are not infallible epistemic and moral agents. 
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To be sure, it is just a fact about the human condition that we are 
subject to all kinds of errors. Granting such 'error conditions' or 
'error possibilities,' scepticism about testimony is inherent in the 
epistemological and moral constitution of rational agents. By 
raising the spectre of epistemic and moral fallibility, Hume is 
throwing the door wide open to a whole scepticism designed to 
undermine testimony as a means of reliable—let alone actual— 
knowledge acquisition. Unlike his standard sceptical arguments, 
which have a legacy at least as far back as Algazali 's The 
Incoherence of the Philosophers (and a disputed history as far back 
as Sextus' Outlines), this new non-metaphysically orientated 
scepticism is, as far as I can tell, original to Hume's philosophy. 
The appeal to the universal conditions of human fallibility, I 
suggest, is also quite successful against the argument claiming that 
ad hominem arguments are fallacies only in certain contexts, and 
hence are fallacies of relevance. Hume's criteria are always relevant 
since they refer to the basic features of human beings as moral and 
psychological agents capable of error. To be sure, there is a 'relevant 
entailment' between the speech-act of testimony itself and the 
circumstances surrounding its utterance that can only be ignored 
at the cost of falsely believing that the propositions expressed in t 
are true. Although one doubts the extent that these criteria could 
legitimate all forms ad hominem arguments, undermining testimony 
through the fallibility of rational/moral agents has the domestic 
effect of allowing one to unconditionally dismiss the testimony of 
the speaker as wcredible. By questioning whether „v has the capacity 
to deceive or be deceived Hume is adducing criteria for the 
acceptance of testimony that cannot be positively answered. 
Unequivocally, Hume is guilty of an ad hominem attack, though 
an ad hominem attack of the non-fallacious type. Not only does he 
attack the credibility of the speaker, but the criteria he determines 
for accepting their testimony are impossible to satisfy. Hume has 
quite successfully determined grounds for what might be 
considered, in some sense at least, an a priori rejection of the 
soundness of testimony. Since prior to hearing any testimony 
whatsoever Hume can reject it on the basis that is cannot satisfy 
his criteria, actually hearing the testimony is pointless; the 
testimony has already been dismissed. Yet, I've suggested that 
10 AUSLEGUNG 
Hume's criticisms are not as severe or as extreme as initial reactions 
may suggest. I think, rather, ad hominem attacks are to be 
r ecommended—even as desirable and as normat ive ly 
prescriptive—in circumstances determining whether to accept the 
testimony of others. Such circumstances, in fact, are stipulated in 
Canadian law. 
Ad hominem Arguments in Canadian Law 
In terms of general legal tactics, the effort of the Crown or 
prosecution during cross-examination is to discount or, at the very 
least, to minimize the impact of witness testimony on the jury. To 
this end, either a witness's formal testimony itself is shown to be 
insubstantial, or the credibility of the witness is shown to be suspect. 
In the former case, Crown wants to demonstrate that there are 
limitations to a witness's ability to accurately recall an event or to 
have accurately observed an event (K. S. Brown, G E. Dix, E. J. 
Imwinkelried, D. H. Kaye, R. P. Mosteller, E. F. Roberts, 1999, 
p.58). Typically, Crown agues that external conditions may have 
corrupted what a witness claims to have been privy to. Crown 
would do well to question, for example, environmental factors that 
may have contaminated ideal conditions of observation. Factors 
such as lighting, the distance between the witness and the event, 
the distracting presence of a crowd, or fast movements are all 
variables that may have obscured important and substantive details 
of the event. There are also internal conditions that effect reporting 
accurately on past events. Such internal conditions include mental 
stress, expectation, fatigue, memory, selective memory, as well as 
the impact of sudden events and preoccupation. In terms of legal 
tactics, the attempt of the prosecution is to demonstrate that the 
testimony of an eyewitness is incapable of withstanding scrutiny. 
Since internal and external conditions affect eyewitness reports, 
the reports themselves may be unreliable and therefore cannot be 
seen as affording an unequivocal measure of proof against the 
accused. 
There are other cases, however, when the testimony of a witness 
is not called into question, but the credibility of the witness as a 
means to disregard their testimony. In other words, do not question 
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the limitations and ability of a witness to accurately recall an event, 
but question the reliability of the testimony based on the credibility 
of the witness. This is effectively the same line of argument we 
have seen Hume follow (cf. lx has the capacity to be deceived or 
would willfully deceive'—hence their testimony should not be 
accepted). 
Now witness credibility is obviously valuable in the case of 
expertise. I am not competent to testify in the capacity of a 
psychologist and my opinions about the psychological dispositions 
and inclinations of a defendant would rightly be dismissed ispo 
facto. Attacking testimony based on the credibility of a witness is 
important in the event that said testimony depends on expertise. 
Are there any other circumstances involving the testimony of non-
experts where it is both desirable and valuable (legally speaking) 
to attack the credibility of a witness and not the testimony of the 
witness? To put the question a different way, is it the case that 
prosecuting attorneys utilize ad hominem arguments and are such 
arguments (logical fallacies) justified? If the attacks are of the 
non-fallacious type, then the answer is 'Yes'—on both counts. In 
the Canadian Civil Evidence Handbook, Cudmore outlines the 
circumstances for utilizing (non-fallacious) ad hominem arguments. 
An initial problem is to delimit what sort of question is relevant 
for the purpose of attacking credibility or the weight of a 
witness's testimony, and, perhaps surprisingly, there is little 
discussion in the decided cases on the proper limits to such 
questioning, at least when the witness is not also the accused in 
a criminal case. It is, on the one hand, the right and duty of the 
court to protect any witness from unfair harassment; questions 
designed only to embarrass or annoy with a view to intimidate 
the witness will not be permitted. On the other hand, it is the 
right of a litigant, or his or her council, to explore the credibility 
of an opposing witness and to minimize the weight that should 
be given to that testimony. Such questioning is legitimate (2003, 
§ 11-6.1). 
Legal testimony, then, not only depends upon matters closely 
related to the event (internal and external variables—lighting, 
preoccupation, and so on) but they are also based on "matters of 
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general integrity, truthfulness, objectivity, even lifestyle, 
antecedents, associations, and so on." (2003, § 11-6.2). 
Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act stipulates that in the 
case when the accused has a previous criminal record, 
(1) A witness may be questioned as to whether the witness has 
been convicted of any offence, excluding any offence designed 
as a contravention under the Conventions Act, but including 
such an offence where the conviction was entered after trial on 
an indictment. 
(1.1) If a witness either denies the fact or refuses to answer, the 
opposite party may prove the conviction (Cudmore, 2003, § 
11-18.4,9). 
In no uncertain terms, it is the prosecutions legal right, at least 
in criminal cases, to question 'whether the witness has been 
convicted of any offence'. If not by name but by content, Cudmore 
clearly recognizes the ad hominem specter raised by previous 
convictions. "This section [s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act] 
assumes what is perhaps an unwarrantable assumption, namely, 
that a witness with a previous conviction is less credible than one 
without such conviction regardless of the nature of the conviction 
or the date it occurred" (2003, § 11-18.4, 9). Nonetheless, the 
likelihood of past offences affording some measure of proof against 
the accused, as emphasized by the Ontario Court of Appeal (R. v. 
Brown), will vary from case to case according to the nature of the 
conviction, their number, and regency (2003, § 11-18.4, 9). Now 
because of the wording of the statute, a trial judge cannot refuse to 
permit questioning based on prior convictions to demonstrate the 
unfavorable character of a witness (2003, §11-18.4, 10). The 
discretionary power a judge retains is limited to the scope of 
questioning. It is the responsibility of the judge to determine what 
prior convictions should be heard by the court lest convictions not 
relevant to the present charge jeopardize the defendant's right to 
an impartial hearing. If, in other words, "a mechanical application 
of s .12 would undermine the defendant's right to a fair trial, then 
the question should be refused" (2003, §11-18.4, 10). 
When questions arise as to which previous convictions are 
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permissible the judge should 'e r r ' on the side of inclusion 
(Cudmore, 2003, §11-18.5). In Thompson, the counsel for the 
accused—a man on trial for murder related to the drug trade— 
requested that the defendant's lengthy criminal record (including 
dishonesty offences) be kept from the jury. The judge, favoring 
inclusion, allowed the defendant's legal history to be questioned 
during cross-examination "remarking that it would be misleading 
for the jury to be kept in the dark about his prior dishonesty" 
(Cudmore, 2003, §11-18.5). On appeal, a judge in the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal later wrote, "I cannot conclude that the 
accused was denied a fair trial by the exercise of the judge's 
discretion" (Cudmore, 2003, §11-18.5). 
In other cases the prejudicial effect is clear. In one case, the 
accused stood trial for sexually assaulting his daughter. His prior 
criminal record included two convictions of rape and two 
convictions for wounding (a more aggressive form of assault and 
battery). The judge determined that during cross-examination the 
defendant's prior criminal offences "should be precluded only as 
a last resort" (Cudmore, 2003, § 11 -18.6). Later, the Court of Appeal 
felt that that while the convictions for wounding should have been 
permitted, the convictions of rape should not have. The defendant's 
right to a fair trail was likely jeopardized by the prejudicial effect 
of the defendant's rape convictions. 
One principle that has emerged relatively clearly is that the 
judge's discretion as to allow cross-examination on previous 
convictions is not an all or nothing application (Cudmore, 2003, 
§11-18.6). Doubtless, the history of a defendant has implications 
for determining a measure of guilt, but if unfairly characterized, 
the accused may face a prejudicial hearing and hence not a fair trial. 
In terms of the ad hominem fallacy, Canadian law clearly values 
attacks of credibility (in the literature, in fact, it is often phrased 
as 'attacking credibility'). Such 'attacks', however, can only go so 
far. The reliability of the testimony of the accused is greatly 
diminished given a history of criminal activity. According to 
Canadian law, "Such evidence only goes to credibility and does 
not constitute character evidence against the accused" (Cudmore, 
2003, §11-18.6). Clearly, the ad hominem factor is evident 
regardless of whether the character of the accused is a target of 
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official legal scrutiny. To put the point in a logical perspective, the 
law sanctions highlighting some negative trait of the defendant as 
a means of dismissing their testimony—and that is a text book 
example of the ad hominem fallacy. 
Intellectual Responsibility 
Of course, just because ad hominem attacks are used in the 
law and are considered legitimate, it does not follow that they are 
legitimate and that, moreover, the legal system does not capitalize, 
at times, on an overt logical fallacy. In terms of actually committing 
the 'fallacy', the legal system (in a corroboration of sorts with 
Hume) is a prime example of RT. Accepting or rejecting testimony 
t is determined by more than t itself. There are extenuating variables 
that bear directly upon the truthfulness and reliability of witness 
testimony. In Canadian law, variables such as the defendant's prior 
convictions, associations, lifestyle, and so on, seem to be just as 
important as / itself. The variables and testimony form a 'package' 
of sorts which, after careful consideration, lend credibility to / and 
hence whether to accept or reject it. Witness testimony in Canadian 
law, therefore, is an example of considering facts relevant to said 
testimony before accepting said testimony—and that is exactly 
what Hume wants us to do in regards to testimony about the 
miraculous. 
In Canadian law, as in Hume, accepting testimony prima facie 
is less intellectually responsible than entertaining testimony with 
an air of caution ('reservation'). The 'air of caution' for Hume is 
an honest attempt to understand another person's psychology; the 
'air of caution' in the law is the probative weight assigned to a 
defendant's history of criminal activity. The justification for ad 
hominem attacks is any reasonable person's commitment to 
intellectual responsibility. It is their obligation, as rational agents, 
to consider all available or relevant facts about a person's testimony. 
Anything less is intellectually irresponsible. To demonstrate the 
normative character of RT (the 'responsibility thesis') consider: 
PI/ To be intellectually responsible is to utilize non-fallacious 
ad hominem attacks (viz., facts other than those contained in 
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testimony / itself) that may be relevant to the acceptance/ 
rejection of t. 
P2/ Accepting t at face value is less intellectually responsible 
than not accepting t or 'reserving' assent to /. 
P3/ It is the prerogative of any rational agent to be as 
intellectually responsible as possible. (It is better to be 
intellectually responsible than intellectually irresponsible. See P2). 
CI So it is the prerogative of any rational agent to utilize non-
fallacious ad hominem attacks (viz., facts other than those 
contained in / itself) before assenting/rejecting /. 
Conclusion 
The question as to why it is important to accept or reject 
testimony should now be clear. First, testimony is a philosophically 
substantive topic because it does entail a theory of knowledge. As 
J.L. Austin once wrote, "The statement of an authority makes me 
aware of something, enables me to know something, which I 
shouldn't otherwise have known. It is a source of knowledge" 
(Coady, 1992, p.3). While it may be true that testimony has not 
played a significant role when contrasted with other competing 
historical epistemologies (divine illumination, rationalism, 
empiricism), Hume clearly recognized its importance for both 
philosopher and non-philosopher alike. If non-empirical knowledge 
of the world is derived, in part, through testimony, then said 
knowledge is only as sound as is the testimony itself. Since 
testimony is suspect for the reasons given, scepticism in regards 
to the knowledge based on testimony is an inevitable and 
foreboding obstacle to the acquisition of knowledge. As a means 
to this end—the rejection of testimony—non-fallacious ad 
hominem arguments provide a powerful objection to non-first 
person epistemological accounts of knowledge and, I suggest, to a 
scepticism unknown in early modern philosophy. Second, the issue 
of the soundness of testimony, whether questioned through the 
use of ad hominem arguments or not, is yet one more area that 
philosophy may lay claim to as having practical importance, 
without which philosopher's are merely well paid hobbyists. 
16 AUSLEGUNG 
In sum, I have argued for the conclusion that non-fallacious 
ad hominem arguments are desirable and to commit them is to 
commit acts of intellectual responsibility. Arguing against a person, 
when legitimate, is the prerogative of any rational being. Hume 
commits himself to the argument and commits himself to it only 
as a judicious inquisitor responsible for the veracity of his own 
beliefs. The desirability of non-fallacious ad hominem 'attacks' is 
clear from their extensive use and rhetorical power in courts of 
law. 
Notes 
1 This antidote appears in d'Andeli's Lai d'Aristotle. Quoted from 
Simon Blackburn, Lust. 2004. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 9-ff. 
2 Kelly, 1988, p. 138. 
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